Diesel Vortex: Russian Cybercrime Group Steals 1,600+ Credentials From Global Logistics Sector

A Russian-linked cybercrime group dubbed Diesel Vortex has been systematically targeting the global freight and logistics industry, stealing over 1,600 unique login credentials from users of major logistics platforms in a sophisticated phishing campaign that ran from September 2025 through February 2026.

Campaign Overview

Security researchers at Have I Been Squatted, in collaboration with Ctrl-Alt-Intel, uncovered the operation after discovering an exposed .git directory that revealed the group’s entire infrastructure, codebase, and victim database. The investigation exposed a structured, financially-driven criminal enterprise with Armenian-language coordination among operators.

Key findings from the investigation:

  • 3,474 credential pairs stolen (1,649 unique)
  • 52 phishing domains deployed
  • 75,840 target contact emails (57,092 unique)
  • 35 check fraud attempts targeting EFS
  • 9,016 unique visitor IPs tracked

Targeted Platforms

The group built dedicated phishing infrastructure impersonating platforms used daily by freight brokers, trucking companies, and supply chain operators:

  • DAT Truckstop – America’s largest freight marketplace
  • Penske Logistics – Fleet management systems
  • Electronic Funds Source (EFS) – Fuel card and payment networks
  • Timocom – European freight exchange
  • Teleroute – European load board
  • Central Dispatch – Auto transport marketplace
  • Girteka – Cross-border transport logistics

Phishing-as-a-Service Operation

Analysis of the recovered codebase revealed Diesel Vortex operates a Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform internally branded as “GlobalProfit” and marketed to other operators as “MC Profit Always” – with “MC” likely referring to Motor Carrier operating authority identifiers.

A recovered mind map outlined the group’s entire operational structure, including:

  • Distinct functional roles: call center, mail support, programmer, and acquisition staff
  • Infiltration of logistics and trucking Telegram communities
  • Reseller and outsourcing arrangements
  • Financial tracking across revenue categories
  • Voice phishing (vishing) techniques targeting drivers

Sophisticated Nine-Stage Cloaking System

The phishing infrastructure employed a sophisticated nine-stage funnel before rendering any phishing page, designed to evade security researchers and automated detection:

  1. Global kill switch – Database-controlled master toggle
  2. Scheduling gates – Time-based access restrictions
  3. IP blocklist – 254 entries covering security vendors and cloud providers
  4. ISP filtering – ipinfo.io lookups blocking 49 ASN patterns
  5. User-agent filtering – Blocking crawlers and automation tools
  6. URL parameter gates – Requiring specific GET parameters
  7. Custom path validation – Exact URL path matching
  8. Ban list checks – Additional blocklist verification
  9. Final render decision – Configurable error codes for blocked requests

Criminal Motivations

With intercepted credentials, the group was able to:

  • Invoice redirection – Diverting payments to attacker-controlled accounts
  • Double-brokering – Intercepting and re-brokering legitimate loads
  • Check fraud – Direct financial theft via EFS
  • PII theft – Harvesting personal information for further attacks
  • Account takeover – Full control of victim logistics accounts

Coordinated Takedown

A coordinated takedown effort involved Google Threat Intelligence Group, Cloudflare, GitLab, IPInfo, and Ping Identity. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center and CrowdStrike provided additional assistance with victim notification efforts.

Implications for the Logistics Sector

This campaign highlights the logistics sector’s vulnerability to targeted phishing attacks. Unlike traditional enterprise targets, trucking companies and independent operators often lack sophisticated security programs, making them attractive targets for credential theft operations.

Organizations in the freight and logistics industry should:

  • Implement FIDO2 hardware security keys for MFA
  • Deploy DNS filtering to block known phishing domains
  • Train staff to recognize voice phishing attempts
  • Monitor for unauthorized account access
  • Use verified payment channels resistant to redirection

Source: Have I Been Squatted